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Summary 
 
In December 2010, the Government launched its consultation on its plans to change the way 
medicines are priced in WKH8. %\DV\VWHPRI µvalue-based pricing¶ (VBP) will replace the 
current Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), which is a voluntary agreement between 
the Department of Health (DH) and the pharmaceutical industry whereby companies negotiate profit 
rates from drug sales to the National Health Service (NHS) every 5 years utilising price and profit 
controls.  The concept of VBP emerged from the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) report in 2007, which 
recommended that prices of individual pharmaceutical products should reflect their 'clinical and 
therapeutic value to patients and the broader NHS'. The introduction of VBP provides an opportunity 
to found pharmaceutical pricing and access to new health technologies on sound principles; reflective 
of social values and the reality of a budget constrained NHS.  This requires: clarity on key issues of 
principle and social value; as well as critical details of how it will be implemented and operate. This 
Research Report describes a potential framework for VBP in the type of devolved NHS envisioned in 
recent government reforms.  It also considers some of the critical features of VBP arrangements 
which need to be appropriately specified if the potential benefits are to be realised. 
 
Any assessment of value must be founded on the type of transparent scientific assessment of the 
costs and benefits offered by a technology which is already embodied in the National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) appraisal process. It is also important that the assessment of 
the health expected to be forgone elsewhere in the NHS due to additional costs displacing other NHS 
activities, i.e., the cost-effectiveness threshold, is evidence based.  In addition, transparent rules of 
how prices might be negotiated based on such assessments are required.  Rules, which are reflective 
of markets in other sectors where investment is also protected by patent, provide a suitable model.  
The triggers for when VBPs, once set, would be reconsidered must include patent expiry and the 
entry of cheaper generics and significant new evidence becoming available. Without the former, the 
NHS may never benefit from innovation even in the longer run and, without the latter, incentives for 
manufacturers conducting evaluative research will be undermined and/or the NHS will not realise the 
benefits of publically funded research.   
 
The details of how the VBP scheme will be implemented and operate are also important.  For 
example, an effective vehicle for price negotiation might be value-based rebates through a PPRS-type 
arrangement rather than reductions in UK list prices.  Since the UK represents only 3% of the world 
market the influence of VBP in the UK on global investment appears limited.  However, there is an 
opportunity to use the scheme to align incentives for local prescribing, which, in the absence of 
mandatory NICE guidance on the use of health technologies after 2014, is especially important.  
Since VBP is necessarily linked to particular indications and subgroups, there is an inevitable link 
between price and volume. Therefore, any agreed rebate needs to be combined with volume 
agreements which might be specified at a national or local level. 
 
The introduction of VBP also poses the question of whether there are other aspects of social value 
which ought to be included.  Although supporting innovation is important, the notion that paying 
µLQQRYDWLRQ premiums¶ for particular products has little to commend it. There are also other aspects of 
value, however, which might be included, such as effects outside the NHS and/or different weights 
that might be attached to health improvement in different circumstances.  Critically, extending the 
scope and/or weights applied to the benefits of a drug must be matched by accounting for those same 
aspects of benefit that are likely to be given up to release resources for new technologies. Finally, 
uncertainty in the assessment of costs and health benefits, the need for further evidence and the 
irrecoverable costs committed when the NHS purchases a technology also needs to be reflected in 
initial VBP at launch and in subsequent reappraisal and renegotiation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the advent of the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) in 1999, the NHS 
has used formal methods of cost-effectiveness analysis as a major input into its decisions about the 
use of new medical technologies, principally pharmaceuticals.  NICE's rationale, processes and 
preferred methods are grounded in the reality of a fixed NHS budget constraint such that, if a new and 
more costly medication is to be funded, other services will need to be curtailed or eliminated to 
release the necessary resources which will have a negative impact on the health of other types of 
patients.1 Throughout this period it has been clear that the value for money of new pharmaceuticals is 
strongly influenced by the prices set by manufacturers which are typically determined with a view to 
the international market rather than the specific requirements of the NHS.  Unlike some other 
countries like France and Italy, the NHS does not engage in a process of determining the price at 
which it is willing to adopt a specific new product.  In contrast, the UK government's approach to the 
financial regulation of the pharmaceutical industry has been defined over the last 50 years or so 
through the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS).2 This voluntary agreement with the 
pharmaceutical industry has sought to strike a balance between creating the conditions conducive to 
a thriving pharmaceutical sector and value for money in the medicines purchased by the NHS.  
However, the potential has been identified for improving upon the current system of regulating the 
overall rate of return a company achieves on capital invested by assessing the price at which a given 
product would represent good value to the NHS.3  In 2007 the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
recommended an alternative approach for the PPRS by which the prices of individual pharmaceutical 
products reflect their 'clinical and therapeutic value to patients and the broader NHS'.4  This concept 
of 'value-based pricing' (VBP) was broadly welcomed by the previous administration5 and is now a 
key feature of Coalition Government's policy towards the PPRS which is due to be renegotiated in 
2014.6 
 
This fundamental change in pharmaceutical regulation offers an opportunity to align the incentives of 
manufacturers, the NHS and individual prescribers.  To realise these gains, however, there needs to 
be careful specification of the scheme, with emphasis on a clear definition of value. The principles of 
value-based pricing (VBP) might be better described as 'benefit based pricing': the price at which the 
health benefits of a new product  are no less than the health benefits forgone as a result of services 
displaced to fund it. The debate following publication of the OFT report4 focused primarily on the role 
VBP would have in aligning the incentives for investment in research and development with the needs 
of the NHS.  However, the type of devolved NHS envisaged in the recent white paper6 suggests that 
VBP has the potential also to have a much more significant role in aligning incentives for prescribers.  
In other words, VBP has a role in aligning incentives 'up and out' of the NHS but also µGRZQDQGLQ¶.  
This paper examines the principles of value-based pricing in a collectively-funded health care system 
like the UK NHS (Section 2).  It also develops a series of proposals for how these principles might be 
best implemented, highlighting particularly critical issues (Section 3).  Finally it examines whether and 
how other aspects of value might be taken into account (Section 4).   
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2. Principles of value-based pricing 
 
The value of a technology to the NHS requires a clear definition of the social objectives of collectively 
funded health care and a means of measuring whether the technology, at the price offered to the 
NHS, meets these social objectives. If the primary purpose is to improve health across the NHS then 
a technology can be said to be of value if the health expected to be gained from its use exceeds the 
health forgone as other NHS activities are displaced by its additional cost, i.e., if it is expected to 
improve overall health outcomes across the NHS.  These assessments of health gained and forgone 
are already central to the NICE Technology appraisal process.1  
 
2.1 Value price and cost-effectiveness 
 
The concept of value and its relationship to price and cost-effectiveness is illustrated in Figure 1.7 The  
new technology offers a gain of two units of health outcome, here expressed as quality adjusted life 
years (QALYs), at an additional cost to the NHS of £20,000 (an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of 
£10,000 per QALY gained). The key question is whether the expected gain of 2 QALYs from this 
innovation is greater than the health outcomes (in QALYs) forgone elsewhere due to other NHS 
treatments being displaced by the additional cost. 
 
Figure 1 Value, price and cost-effectiveness (adapted from Claxton et al.7) 
 
If the transaction price is set at T1 then the additional NHS costs of £20,000 will be expected to 
displace 1 QALY elsewhere, based on the lower range for cost-effectiveness threshold adopted by 
NICE (see Section 3.6.3).  Therefore, at a price of T1, the technology offers net health benefits to the 
NHS (it is expected to be cost-effective).  At higher prices more health will be displaced elsewhere, 
and when price is equal to T* the expected gains in health outcome are just offset by the health 
expected to be forgone by the higher NHS costs (£40,000).  At this point, there are no net health 
benefits to the NHS, so T* represents the maximum transaction price the NHS can afford to pay for 
the benefits offered by this technology.  T* represents the value (benefit) based price so, if the NHS 
was to pay more than T*, e.g., T2, the technology would damage overall health outcomes because the 
health expected to be forgone as a consequence of the higher costs (£60,000) would exceed the 
health expected to be gained.  
 
£20,000 
per QALY
£40,000Price = T*
Cost-effectiveness 
Threshold 
£20,000 per QALY
QALYs gained
Cost
£60,000
£30,000 
per QALY
Price = T2
3
£20,000
2
£10,000 
per QALY
Price = T1
1
Net Health Benefit
1 QALY
Net Health Benefit
-1 QALY
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Since manufacturers already have an incentive to price their products to the point where net benefits 
are zero (at T*), with a single indication and no identified subgroups all the value of the innovation will 
be appropriated by the manufacturer through the sales revenue they receive (the total value of the 
innovation to the NHS for the volumes associated with the indication (Q*) is T*.Q* and all of this value 
is appropriated by the manufacturer in the form of revenue).  The NHS has no incentive for early 
uptake of the technology and, in the short run at least, ought to be indifferent between early access 
and delaying until patent expires and cheaper generics enter the market (see Figure 3)a. 
 
If there are multiple indications and/or subgroups within a single indication DQµDYHUDJH¶value-based 
price, which would make the technology just cost-HIIHFWLYHµRQDYHUDJH¶RYHU the relevant indications 
and subgroups, would allow all value to be appropriated by the manufacturer (it would be equivalent 
to price discrimination).  Some share of value will accrue to the NHS (providing an incentive for early 
uptake) if the rules of VBP are reflective of other markets in other sectors which are also protected by 
patent. Elsewhere temporary monopolies (created by patent protection) can freely select their price 
but have to be mindful of the implications that a higher price will have on sales.  Applied to 
pharmaceuticals, manufacturers may choose a high price but they must then accept lower sales 
volumes.  Alternatively, if they choose a lower price which provides unrestricted coverage across all 
indications and subgroups (where there are zero net benefits for the marginal indication or subgroup), 
there ought to be some positive net benefit for some patient groups.  In other words, the value of the 
innovation is shared to some extent during patient protection just like in other markets.7-8  This 
SULQFLSOHRIµPDUJLQDO¶value-based pricing is illustrated in Figure 2 where the technology is most cost-
effective for subgroup S1 and least cost-effective for subgroup S3. 
 
Figure 2 A menu of price and volume (adapted from Claxton et al8) 
 
The assessment of expected costs and effects across indications and/or subgroups essentially 
presents the collective NHS demand curve to the manufacturer.  Just as a temporary monopolist in 
other markets may chose where to locate, pharmaceutical manufacturers may choose from the menu 
of price (Ti) and associated coverage (Qi).  For example, if they were to choose T1 their sales volume 
would be restricted to Q1 (revenue of T1.Q1).  Alternatively choosing a price of T3 would be associated 
with Q3 of sales across all the subgroups of indications (S1 to S3 with, in this case, higher revenue of 
                                                          
a
 Once a drug has been developed, the longer term benefits which follow generic entry (see Figure 3) will be realised whether 
or not the NHS purchases the more expensive brand.  However, in the longer run such a policy would undermine incentives for 
development of future drugs which will also offer net benefits on patent expiry, although the adverse impact on dynamic 
efficiency for the NHS depends in part on the UKs share of the world market. 
Price
T1
Quantity 
T2
T3
Q1 Q3Q2
S1 S2 S3
Choose Coverage Revenue Net Benefit
T1 S1 T1.Q1 0
T2 S1+S2 T2.Q2 A
T3 S1+S2+S3 T3.Q3 A+B+C
A
CB
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T3.Q3).  The NHS would receive some share of the total value with net benefits of A+B in S1 and C in 
S2 (T3 is the VBP for S3, the marginal subgroup).  Setting aside the marginal production costs, 
manufacturers have an incentive to maximise revenue (located at unit price elasticity) which in Figure 
2 is at T3,Q3.  However, this need not be the case depending on how subgroups are defined and how 
cost-effectiveness and coverage changes across subgroups.  It should be noted that a choice of T1,Q1 LV QR ZRUVH IRU WKH 1+6 DV D ZKROH WKDQ DQ µDYHUDJH¶ value-based price which would make the 
technology just cost-HIIHFWLYHµRQDYHUDJH¶RYHU43 (also equivalent to price discrimination, i.e., T1 for 
S1, T2 for S2 and T3 for S3).  In both cases the net health benefits to the NHS will be zero. The only 
difference between these outcomes is the way health gains and health losses are distributed.  Clearly 
manufacturers will have a strong incentive not to identify any VXEJURXSVVLQFHWKHµDYHUDJH¶9%3ZLOO
allow them to appropriate all the value.  
 
Sometimes other mutually beneficial µdeals¶ could in principle be done, e.g., a manufacturer who 
would otherwise choose T1, Q1 may be willing to agree to price greater than T3 for Q3, which would 
still offer net health benefits to the NHS while increasing their revenue.  Such µdeals¶ are not available 
to temporary monopolists in other types of market as they depend on negotiation with a monopsony 
purchaser.  Although such beneficial deals are possible, they must be balanced against the potential 
adverse outcomes once the principle of transparent rules mirroring other markets is conceded.  
Firstly, there will be a danger that the monopsonist may start to exploit its power, forcing down prices 
below T3 by offering all or nothing deals to manufacturers and undermining patent protection.  Even 
the possibility of this type of outcome now or in the future will undermine confidence that investment 
returns can be realised, making research and development more costly. Secondly, there may be a 
danger that those negotiating on behalf of the NHS could be µcaptured¶ by the manufacturer especially 
when µGHDOV¶DUHSRVVLEOHUDWKHU WKDQIROORZLQJVLPSOHDQGWUDQVSDUHQWUXOHVIRUZKLFKDFFRXQWDELOLW\
and redress is possible (see Section 3.6.4). Thirdly, it is not at all clear that the monopsonist will have 
the upper hand in such negotiation if the level of transparency and accountability expected of public 
bodies is greater than that expected of manufacturers.  This seems especially problematic when there 
is inevitable political pressure to provide NHS access to a technology, i.e., negotiators may be 
susceptible to all or nothing deals from manufacturers which damage the NHS (e.g., T1, Q3).  Finally, 
if there is a proper analysis of subgroups within the relevant indications,9 it is very unlikely that high 
price and low coverage options will be revenue maximising (as long as list prices are preserved ± see 
Section 3.1) . However, if µdeals¶ are possible, T1,Q1 is very likely to be taken as a negotiating starting 
point by manufacturers even if it does not represent their revenue maximising position.   For all these 
reasons simple and transparent rules that mirror other markets (a choice of µmarginal¶ value-based 
prices and associated volumes) should be regarded as the most appropriate basis for VBP.  This 
balances the interests of all sides (including other sectors which compete for government support, 
public money and private capital) and offers clear, accountable and predictable signals with the 
possibility of redress. 
 
2.2 The future value of a product 
 
A key issue with VBP is whether the concept of value fully reflects the benefits to health systems in 
the longer term.7-8 10-11    Even where there are no net benefits during patent protection, in the longer 
run, if cheaper generics become available, following patent expiry then the health care system may 
ultimately benefit.  This requires certain conditions to be satisfied ± most importantly, that the generic 
market remains competitive and that the prices of future newly patented drugs reflect their value when 
compared to the cheaper generic versions of the old brand and, if they do not, then all prescribing 
switches to the generic version of the old brand.  If any of these conditions are not met, the heath care 
system, as a whole, may never benefit from innovation and the low net benefits observed in the short 
term will be realised in the longer run as well.  However, even when these conditions are met the 
private sector may still retain a significant proportion of value in the long run.11  
 
An example of this is illustrated in Figure 3 which shows the cumulative value of an innovation over 
time (discounted at a rate of 3.5%) and how this total value is shared between the manufacturer and 
the health care system.  Initially, during patent protection at the VBP (for a product with a single 
indication and no identifiable subgroups), all value is appropriated by the manufacturer.  At 15 years 
from launch the patent on the product expires and, assuming that competitive generics enter, the 
market price of that product will then fall.  Assuming that: i) competitive generic entry occurs reducing 
prices to 25% of the brand; and either ii) all prescribing is switched to generics (and/or the price of the 
brand is reduced to generic levels); and iii) any new patented drugs are priced relative to the generic 
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version of the old, then the health care system will begin to benefit from the innovation and start to 
share some of the value of the innovation with the manufacturer.  However, the manufacturer will still 
retain most of the value even in the long run.  In this example, at 30 years the manufacturer 
appropriates 72% of the value and even at an unbounded time horizon (i.e. assuming that the 
innovation is forever relevant) it still retains 57%.  Of course, the manufacturer's share will be higher 
(and the NHS share lower) if any of the three assumptions above do not hold and none can be taken 
for granted. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Sharing value over time 
 
Any system of pricing and reimbursement should not undermine the protection offered by patents by 
exploiting the monopsony power of collective purchasing.  The current system does not do so nor do 
the proposals for VBP: both provide manufacturers with an incentive, and the freedom, to price their 
products up to the point where net benefits are zero. The NHS will start to share the value of the 
innovation with the manufacturer following patent expiry, but should this potential future value also be 
transferred to the manufacturer?  This would mean incurring negative net benefits during patent 
protection which may only be recovered later if the three assumptions described above hold.  For the 
NHS this would be worse than indefinitely extending patents (that would assure zero rather than 
negative net benefits).  It is also unlikely to be efficient since the health care system and other parts of 
the public sector contribute directly and indirectly to innovation through, for example, the infrastructure 
of basic science and clinical research, so should share the rewards to align investment incentives 
appropriately.  Finally there are legitimate questions of social value: how the value of innovation 
should be shared across society (NHS, the pharmaceutical and other sectors for the economy) and 
between NHS patients, UK citizens and manufacturers and their shareholders often located outside 
the UK.   
 
Value-based pricing aligns returns in the UK with NHS needs   (with some, albeit limited influence on 
global investment decisions) as long as the measure of benefit captures those aspects of outcome 
that are socially valuable (see Sections 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4) and an assessment of what is likely to be 
displaced is empirically based (see Section 3.6.3). Nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that some 
innovations today will provide the basis for subsequent innovations which may be even more valuable 
in the future.  The question is who should anticipate the benefits of the possibilities of further 
innovation and when should the NHS pay for them (see Section 4.1).   
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3. Value-based pricing in a devolved NHS 
 
Although currently there is little detail about how VBP will work in the NHS, more details have 
emerged about the future role of NICE.  Importantly, from 2014, not only will NICE guidance no longer 
be mandatory, it will no longer issue guidance about whether or not a technology is or is not cost-
effective or whether it is recommended for NHS use.12  Taken in isolation this announcement 
appears, at first sight, to be a significant step back from evidence based policy in the NHS.  However, 
the Government has also made clear that VBP, based on NICE appraisal, will be introduced at the 
same time.12   If successful, VBP could well mean that the type of mandatory guidance issued by 
NICE based on prices offered by manufacturers will become unnecessary.  However, the success of 
a VBP scheme for a newly devolved NHS depends critically on details of the type of scheme 
envisaged and of how it might be implemented.   
 
3.1 An effective vehicle for price rebates? 
 
A substantial segment of the world market references UK drug prices (estimated at 25% by OFT12).  
Therefore, manufacturers will typically be unwilling to lower their list price in the UK to match a VBP 
relevant to the NHS.  Over recent years there has been an increase in patient access schemes 
offered by manufacturers during the NICE appraisal process.13  These schemes essentially offer a 
discount to the NHS whilst maintaining a product's list price.  This is achieved by defining a marker of 
clinical success which has to be achieved in each patient in order for the full list price to be paid.  
However, such schemes are already costly to administer, and there is evidence that the discounts 
offered are not always recovered by the NHS.14  Such schemes are unlikely to provide an effective 
vehicle for administering VBPs after 2014 when the scheme will apply to all new drugs. 
 
A more effective and less costly mechanism would be to use the current PPRS mechanism to recoup 
any discrepancy between the list and the VBP.  For example, where the value-based or transaction 
price (T*) was less than the list price (L), manufacturers would be asked to agree to pay the rebate (L-
T*) through the PPRS.  The rebate might be paid directly or recovered through price cuts (with 
'modulation' where companies have flexibility in deciding which products have prices reduced) for 
those drugs not subject to VBP.  This mechanism has a number of advantages. Firstly, it removes the 
administrative burden of patient access schemes from the local NHS.  Secondly, it allows 
manufacturers to maintain their list price which means they can isolate the effect of VBP from 
international referencing and be more likely to agree to such rebates.  Finally, manufacturers retain 
freedom to set list prices and might also retain freedom to modulate the price of other products not 
covered by VBP. 
 
3.2 Incentives for NHS prescribers 
 
It is important that any VBP scheme aligns incentives for local prescribing, especially in the absence 
of mandatory NICE guidance after 2014. This will require the DH to hold back that part of drug 
expenditure which will be covered by value-based pricing and allocate L or T* to local prescribers 
based on use and whether or not a rebate agreement with a manufacturer is in place.  This should not 
be regarded as an administrative budget for pharmaceuticals but rather an allocation mechanism from 
DH to local prescribers based on value.  Some assessment will be required of likely expenditure to 
ensure that DH retains sufficient resources to reimburse local prescribers.   
 
For example, those drugs included in the VBP scheme and for which there is an agreed value-based 
rebate, the DH could reimburse NHS prescribers at the list price in the knowledge that they will 
recover the difference from the manufacturer through the agreed rebate.  Importantly, NHS 
prescribers would retain an incentive to negotiate local discounts (d) on the list price.   Hence 
incentives are aligned: NHS prescribers will pay L-d, but receive L from the DH; DH will pay L to 
prescribers but receive a rebate of L-T* from the manufacturers; and manufacturers will receive L-d 
but pay a rebate of L-T* to the DH.  Alternatively, DH could only reimburse local prescribers the 
difference between list price and value (L-T*)b.  The difficulty is that this type of reimbursement would 
                                                          
b
 Local prescribers would face the value-based cost of the drug when making prescribing choices between drugs within the 
VBP scheme and those not covered by VBP.  However, if list price is reimbursed by DH then the local cost of drugs with a VBP 
rebate in place will be much lower than those outside the scheme, providing a strong incentive to prescribe the VBP drug.  As 
long as the VBP are set appropriately and volume agreements are in place (see Section 4.4) the accelerated uptake of VBP 
drugs may well be appropriate. 
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reveal T*, which, given the implications of international reference pricing, would make manufacturers 
reluctant to agree rebates.   
 
Where the list price is already below the VBP no rebate is necessary so manufacturers will receive L-
d from prescribers and DH will pay L to prescribers.  Any local discounts achieved (L-d) can be used 
locally to provide other NHS care. 
 
It is possible that, for particular products, manufacturers will not be willing to agree to a value-based 
rebate of (L-T*).  This is much more likely if they believe that local prescribers will be willing to pay L 
anyway.  Therefore, it is important that VBP is used to align incentives for prescribers which, in turn, 
will provide an incentive for manufacturers to agree to a rebate.  This might be achieved by the DH 
not reimbursing prescribers when an agreement is not in place.  In these circumstances incentives 
are also aligned: NHS prescribers will remain free to choose to purchase the drug.  If the appraisal is 
reflective of the costs and benefits they face locally, they ought to be willing to pay up to T*.  
Therefore, they may nevertheless choose to prescribe if they can negotiate local discounts so that L-
d=T*, or pay more than T* if they believe that there are greater than expected benefits for particular 
patients.c 
 
This has a number of advantages.  Firstly, it leaves prescribers free to negotiate local discounts 
and/or chose to prescribe because the value to a particular patient is believed to be higher than T*.  
Secondly, manufacturers have an incentive to agree a rebate since prescribing costs (L-d) will fall on 
ORFDOSUHVFULEHU¶VEXGJHWV/RFDOSUHVFULEHU¶VGHFLVLRQVPD\KRZHYHUEHLQIRUPHGE\WKH9%3WKDW
would have been acceptable to DH. This may provide an additional incentive for the manufacturer to 
agree rebates since failure to do so will reveal T*, with potential consequences in other markets 
through reference pricing.   If an agreement is in place, local prescribers do not need to know T* and 
what rebate was agreed between manufacturers and the DH.  Whether a scheme which retains 
transparency and accountability can also effectively withhold the information which would allow T* to 
be derived when an agreement is made is discussed in Section 3.6.4. 
  
Rebate agreements alone, however, would incentivise over prescribing of those products where an 
agreement is in place, putting the NHS at risk of unjustified growth in expenditure on branded 
pharmaceuticals.  Since any VBP relates to particular indications and or subgroups (see Figure 2), 
any rebate also needs to be linked to volumes associated with the agreed T*.  
 
3.3 Value-based rebate with volume agreements 
 
To establish accountability and to give clear and predictable signals to manufacturers, it is important 
WKDWSULFHµQHJRWLDWLRQ¶avoids undermining incentives.  On the one hand, the process needs to ensure 
that incentives for innovation on the part of manufacturers are preserved by avoiding the NHS 
exploiting or appearing to exploit its monopsony power.  On the other hand, manufacturers should not 
be permitted to appropriate all the value of new products through either price discrimination (that is, 
agreeing a different T for each indication and sub-group - see Figure 2) or all or nothing deals (see 
Section 2.1).  To achieve this balance, it is important to have transparent rules which mirror markets 
in other sectors where innovation is also protected by patent.  In other markets the temporary 
monopoly created by patent protection may choose where to locate on the market demand curve.  
 
Any VBP will relate to a particular indication, groups of indications or particular patient subgroups 
within an indication. Where there are a number of subgroups and/or indications, the NHS demand 
curve is represented by the combinations of evidence based Ti and associated Qi (see Figure 2).  The 
manufacturer should be free to choose from this menu, i.e., they may choose a higher Ti but 
associated with a narrower indication/subgroup and, therefore, a lower volume, Qi, associated with it.  
Therefore, for each drug once a value-based rebate is agreed there would be a single T*, Q* chosen 
from the available Ti,Qi combinations available. 
 
Mandating that prescribing be restricted to the indication(s)/subgroup(s) associated with the particular 
T* included in the agreed rebate would seem to undermine the principles of a more devolved NHS, 
where NICE guidance informs rather than determines which drugs should be used and for which 
                                                          
c
 This would avoid DH effectively reducing the local price of these drugs compared to those not included in the VBP scheme. 
That part of drug expenditure retained by DH to reimburse the drug if an agreement had been reached would need to be 
allocated back to the local NHS in the following period to avoid an effective cut in local resources.   
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particular types of patients.  However, since prescribers will be reimbursed at list price, there is a 
danger of over prescribing as there would be no incentive to restrict their prescribing to the indications 
and subgroups (Q*) associated with the agreed T*.  This would place the NHS and DH at 
considerable risk of unjustified growth in prescribing expenditure for indications not covered by the 
rebate agreement where T* exceeds the value in these groups.  There are broadly two responses to 
this problem.  
 
The first is that reimbursement could be made conditional on the prescriber demonstrating that it was 
for the indication(s) and subgroup(s) covered by the agreement.  The costs of prescribing beyond the 
coverage of the rebate would not be reimbursed and fall on prescribers' budgets.   There are number 
of ways in which the administrative burden of such conditions might be reduced.  For example, 
reimbursement from DH could be paid periodically based on routinely collected information about the 
number of patients treated which fall under the rebate agreement, i.e., the prescriber will be 
reimbursed at L up to the Q* relevant to their local patient population (if the subtleties of distinctions 
between subgroups are not routinely recorded, the Q* for the local prescriber might be based on 
national estimates of the proportion of the indication accounted for by relevant sub group).  However, 
there are a number of alternative ways in which the rebate paid can be restricted to Q* without 
recourse to imposing mandatory guidance on local prescribers - a new role for the Healthcare 
Commission is one of many possibilities.   
 
Alternatively (or in addition), a value-based rebate agreement could also include a volume agreement 
at a national level, where, for volumes up to Q*, a rebate of L-T* is paid.  However, for volumes 
greater than Q* a greater rebate will be required because T* (what the DH ultimately pays) will exceed 
the value to the NHS.  Any volume agreement should not place the manufacture at risk of incurring 
costs when they cannot directly control the volume of NHS prescribing.  This could be achieved by 
setting the rebate for volumes greater than Q* as the difference between list price and the marginal 
production costs (C).  Prescribing beyond Q* will not impose costs on the manufacturer since sales 
revenue will cover their costs.  It may impose costs on the NHS if the value of the drug beyond Q* is 
less than C but then it is appropriately the responsibility of the NHS to ensure that prescribing is 
focused on the most valuable indications and subgroups (informed by NICE guidance and/or making 
reimbursement by DH conditional as discussed above).   Of course, the marginal production costs of 
a new product are unlikely to be revealed by manufacturers, even if they have that information 
available.  However, such costs are revealed by a competitive generics market.  Therefore C and the 
greater rebate beyond Q* can be based on generic prices for comparable types of drugs.  This 
arrangement has a number of advantages: 
 
 The DH is not put at risk of significant increases in expenditure due to over prescribing where 
a value-based rebate is in place. 
 The small risk pool of some local prescribers will not place them at financial risk and deter 
uptake when an agreement is in place for drugs with high list prices (the DH essentially pools 
this risk centrally). 
 The speed of uptake of new drugs with high acquisition costs but where a value-based rebate 
is in place would be expected to increase with claimed positive spin offs, e.g. incentives for 
manufacturers to launch in the UK and an improved research environment within the NHS. 
 Manufacturers are not put at risk of incurring net costs as a consequence of NHS prescribing 
above Q*. 
 The costs to the DH and the revenue to manufacturers becomes more predictable than is 
currently the case where there is no VBP or Q* agreed. 
 There is little incentive for manufacturers to devote resources to marketing beyond the 
indication(s) and/or subgroup(s) associated with the agreed T*. 
 Manufacturers when offered the choice between higher Ti but with a lower Qi, or lower Ti but 
with wider coverage of the agreement  (a higher Qi) are more likely to choose the latter if 
there is no strategic or financial advantage of agreeing a higher Ti but then hoping to market 
beyond the associated Qi. 
 Only volume would need to be monitored (possibly with an assessment of a local Q*) rather 
than monitoring the reasons for prescribing and then putting effort into restricting prescribing 
to indications and subgroups associated with T*, i.e., the incentives for prescribers are 
aligned with evidence of value embodied in NICE guidance while leaving them free to 
exercise clinical judgement.  
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 The type of appraisal conducted by NICE, which would inform value-based prices, also 
informs the assessment of Qi for each Ti that might be agreed, based on evidence relevant to 
the NHS.  This would provide some transparency and accountability in the assessment of 
both Ti and Qi which, with current consultation rights in the NICE process as well as redress 
through appeals and judicial review, would provide a reassurance to manufacturers that both 
the Tis and Qis on offer are an evidence based expression of the NHS demand curve for their 
products.  Importantly, they would also be to a large extent predictable, providing a clear 
signal of likely returns for those making investment decisions in drug development.    
 
Whether a national rebate-volume agreement would itself be sufficient, or whether incurring the 
additional costs of monitoring and/or establishing local volumes for conditional reimbursement would 
be appropriate might be established case by case.  Clearly, where there is a large discrepancy 
between L and T* and where the agreed Q* is associated with only a small subset of all the patients 
who may benefit from the drug, then the latter is more likely to be worthwhile.   
 
3.4 Reducing postcode prescribing 
 
Postcode prescribing can be defined as geographical variation in access to NHS treatments for 
patients who are similar in terms of the characteristics which are relevant to the expected costs and 
benefits of those treatments.   The existence of such variation may be regarded as unjust in a 
collectively funded national health care system. One fundamental problem has been that the way 
resources are allocated to localities has not necessarily reflected the local resource implications of 
national guidance issued by organisations such as NICE.  NICE guidance issued through the 
Technology Appraisal (TA) Programme has been mandatory since 2001.  The mandatory nature of 
this guidance should, in principle at least, have reduced variation in access to those drugs subject to 
TA guidance.  The problem is that access to other health care, including other drugs, must be 
restricted to accommodate the additional NHS costs of such guidance.  Therefore, reducing postcode 
prescribing for part of NHS prescribing can only increase geographic variations in access to other 
care not covered by such guidance.  This unintended consequence of mandatory guidance is 
inevitable if resource allocation does not precisely match the costs of such guidance for local patient 
populations.  
 
The type of value-based rebate scheme described above would to, some extent, overcome this 
problem since resources would flow from DH to localities based on the value of using particular drugs 
for agreed indication(s) and/or subgroups.  Where a value-based rebate agreement is in place there 
seems little reason why geographic variation in access should persist even without mandatory 
national guidance.  But more importantly, and unlike mandatory guidance, this will not lead to 
geographic variations in displaced health care as long as local prescribers are reimbursed by DH at 
the list price.  However, when a value-based rebate is not agreed some variation in use would be 
expected, partly reflecting different assessments of value for particular patients, but also variations in 
local efficiency as well as the possibility that the allocation of the greater part of NHS resources may 
not fully reflect the local cost of providing access to the same care given the mix of the local patient 
population. 
 
3.5 Implications for NHS costs 
 
The DH could accept initially higher NHS costs as the coverage of VBP expands from 2014 due to the 
lag before  agreed rebates are received, i.e., NHS initially pays L but receives L-T* in the following 
period.  Alternatively the agreement could include proYLVLRQVIRUµSD\PHQWRQDFFRXQW¶LQWKHILUVW\HDU
based on L-T* and an estimate of the likely volume (Q*) associated with the indication for which T* 
ZDVHVWLPDWHG,QWKHIROORZLQJ\HDUDµEDODQFLQJSD\PHQW¶EDVHGRQDFWXDOYROXPHVFRXOGEHPDGH 
 
It should be noted that applying VBP only to new drugs will not offer any saving to the NHS or any net 
health benefits in the short term.  In the longer run, as generics enter, the NHS will start to accrue 
benefits so long as VBP for future branded drugs are relative to generic versions of the old brand 
available at that time (see Section 2.2).  However, applying VBP to existing technologies where the 
current price paid by the NHS is thought to be greater than its value (e.g., where branded drugs at 
premium prices continue to be prescribed despite equivalent generics being available) would offer an 
opportunity to reduce costs and generate benefit.  Therefore, it would seem sensible to include into 
the VBP scheme at the outset some existing technologies (those where L>T* and which generate 
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large NHS expenditures) as well as new technologies. This could be used to ensure the scheme is 
cost neutral after the first year.   
 
There may be circumstances when L<T*, in which case no value-based rebate agreement would be 
needed.  However, in these circumstances, manufacturers will have a strong incentive to increase list 
prices so that L=T, increasing NHS costs. Therefore, including some existing drugs in the VBP 
scheme could also be used to offset the cost implications of these incentives. 
 
3.6 Role of NICE 
 
Existing methods1 and processes15-16 can already establish value-based prices of technologies.  
However, there are some critical issues which, if not properly addressed, could mean that VBP does 
more harm than good: increasing NHS costs and reducing overall health outcomes as expensive new 
technologies displace more valuable NHS activities.  Maintaining the independence and robustness of 
evidence based methods of appraisal developed by NICE is fundamental. However, four other 
considerations are particularly critical for the success of VBP. 
 
3.6.1 NICE appraisal process 
 
Through its methods of appraisal and the process of deliberation by its advisory committees, NICE 
issues guidance on whether technologies represent a cost-effective use of NHS resources based on 
the list prices offered by manufacturers at launch.  Therefore, NICE appraisal can already establish 
the price at which a technology could be regarded as cost-effective and of value to the NHS.  In other 
words, NICE has been undertaking the fundamental aspects of appraisal required to establish 
evidence based assessment of value since its inception.  The restriction has been that NICE is unable 
to negotiate prices with manufacturers.  Nevertheless, over recent years it has become increasingly 
common for manufacturers to offer patient access schemes (PAS) either before or, more commonly, 
during the NICE appraisal process when it is apparent that the technology is unlikely to be regarded 
as cost-effective at the list price.  In some ways the increased use of patient access schemes, which 
effectively offer different forms of discount to the NHS but without formally changing the list price,13 
has been a form of de facto value-based pricingd.   
 
The appraisal process also commonly considers the cost-effectiveness of the technology, not just for 
the whole indication under consideration, but also for subgroups within the indication.  Therefore, the 
current appraisal process is already capable of establishing the combinations of values (Tis) and 
coverage levels (Qis) from which the manufacturer can choose T*,Q*.  However, in the past, NICE 
has tended to explore subgroups only when the technology would not be considered cost-effective for 
the whole indication at the list price.  What should be apparent is that, once value-based rebates are 
possible, NICE should always explore subgroups so that manufacturers can always be offered the 
choice of value-based prices with the associated coverage levels.   
 
This is important because it mirrors other markets similarly protected by patents where the temporary 
monopolist selects where to locate on the market demand curve for their product.  It is also important 
for the NHS because, just like other markets, it means that value is more appropriately shared 
between the NHS and manufacturers during patent protection.  A failure to explore subgroups and to 
offer a menu of prices and coverage levels to manufacturers will mean that, at a VBP for the whole 
indication, the additional health benefits offered by the technology will just be offset by the health 
expected to be forgone elsewhere in the NHS due to the additional costs.  All value will be 
appropriated by manufacturers and new technologies will not improve health outcomes overall.  
Indeed, it would be equivalent to allowing perfect price discrimination (see Section 2.1).  In other 
markets, with the exception of natural monopolies, the temporary monopoly offered by patent is 
regarded as sufficient.   
 
The exact role NICE will undertake remains to be determined.  It may supply an assessment of 
expected health benefit and expected costs to a pricing authority which will translate this into a menu 
                                                          
d
 In principle PAS could continue to be considered as part of a VBP scheme (Ti,Qi based on costs and effects with the PAS in 
place).  This would offer manufacturers an opportunity to price discriminate, i.e., offering PAS for lower value subgroups.   
Therefore, if permitted, a greater use of PAS might be expected with attendant monitoring and transactions costs. 
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of VBPs and coverage levels (Ti,Qi) using an empirically based assessment of the cost-effectiveness 
threshold for the NHS (see Section 3.6.3).  Alternatively, NICE may apply the cost-effectiveness 
threshold to the results of its appraisal and then supply the combinations of Ti,Qi to the body 
negotiating value-based rebate agreements.  What is critical is that, whichever organisation uses it, 
the cost-effectiveness threshold is empirically based and estimated and applied in a transparent and, 
therefore, accountable way (see Section 3.6.3).    Without this, the clarity and predictability of the 
signal provided by VBP will be undermined, thus negating the dynamic benefits.  Failure to use an 
appropriate and empirically based threshold would, on one hand, introduce additional uncertainty into 
investment decisions for manufacturers and a fear that monopsony power will be exploited now or in 
the future.   On the other hand, the NHS and wider public might fear that limited NHS resources, 
expected to be employed to provide health care, are in fact being used to provide a hidden and 
unwarranted subsidy to a particular sector of the economy.  This is a particular danger (in reality or 
appearance) and especially in hard pressed times when the spending department responsible for 
representing the NHS as a consumer of drugs (the DH in negotiating the value-based rebates) still 
has the necessarily conflicting responsibility of representing the longer term interest of the 
pharmaceutical sector in the UK.  The latter responsibility would surely be more appropriately 
allocated to the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills as is the case in most other sectors 
which are also legitimately competing for the support of government and public expenditure to ensure 
their longer term interests. 
 
3.6.2 Scope and reappraisal  
 
NICE considers new technologies at launch under the Single Technology Appraisal (STA) process, 
where the appraisal is primarily based on a submission from the manufacturer which is reviewed by 
an independent Evidence Review Group (ERG).   All NICE guidance also includes a date at which the 
guidance will be reviewed and if, at that time, there are sufficient changes to the evidence base or 
other relevant technologies then, commonly, all the technologies available for the indication are 
reappraised under the Multiple Technology Appraisal (MTA) process, where an independent 
Technology Appraisal Review (TAR) group develops an analysis of the whole area taking account of 
submissions from manufacturers and other stakeholders.  This process of an initial STA followed by 
later MTA matches the proposals made by OFT of what they termed an ex-ante assessment at launch 
followed by ex-post assessment some time later (5 years suggested by OFT).4   
 
The initial assessment of Ti, Qi could be undertaken as part of the existing STA process if methods 
and process were strengthened in some respects.  For example, it would require either a greater role 
for the ERG in revising manufacturers' submissions to provide acceptable estimates of Ti,Qi, or more 
iterations with manufacturers so that their analysis reflects the social and scientific judgments of the 
appraisal committees, and routinely exploring subgroups (see Section 3.6.4). 
 
However, any initial assessment based on a STA will need to be revised as: more comparator 
technologies enter through STA; evidence accumulates; and, importantly, generic versions of 
technologies with VBPs enter as patents expire.  A review of a whole indication requires a comparison 
of very many technologies utilising evidence generated by different manufacturers.  Therefore, the 
MTA process seems most appropriate rather than asking manufacturers to make submissions about 
their competitors products when they may not have access to the complete evidence base.  There 
also needs to be a balance between stability of VBPs in the short term, the costs of multiple 
appraisals in the same area (for NICE and manufacturers) and making sure that changing conditions 
are reflected in VBPs.  Explicit criteria, including requests from manufacturers and other stakeholders, 
could be used to initiate reappraisal and to renegotiate the VBP.  These criteria ought to include the 
entry of a generic version of the VBP drug or additional significant evidence, e.g., a large randomised 
trial reporting - whether publically funded or sponsored by a manufacturer.  It should be noted that 
reappraisal triggered by new evidence may increase VBP if the evidence suggests that the benefits of 
the technology were originally underestimated, providing incentives for evaluative research where 
manufacturers believe there are additional benefits not yet evidenced (see Section 4.4). 
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3.6.3 Evidence based cost-effectiveness threshold 
 
An assessment of whether the health expected to be gained from the use of a new technology 
exceeds the health likely to be forgone elsewhere is critical for decisions currently made by NICE and 
is fundamental to establishing value-based prices/rebates.  This requires an estimate of the health 
that is expected to be forgone, on average across the NHS, as other activities are displaced to 
accommodate the additional costs of new technologies. The cost-effectiveness threshold range 
currently used by NICE (£20,000 to £30,000 per QALY gained) is intended to represent precisely that.  
However, it is widely recognised that this informal assessment has limited empirical basis and that 
more robust estimation of the NHS threshold is urgently required.  The Methodology Research 
Programme funded by the National Institute for Health Research and Medical Research Council has 
funded research to establish appropriate methods to estimate the NHS threshold based on routinely 
available sources of data.  This research extends earlier econometric analysis17-18 which utilised NHS 
programme budget data and mortality data for different programmes of care to estimate the 
relationships between programme expenditures and health outcomes.  The results of this initial work 
are summarised in Table 1. 
 
This analysis is being extended in a number of ways by the current research.  Firstly, it will estimate 
these relationships for more programmes of care to cover a greater proportion of overall NHS 
expenditure.  Secondly, the relationship between changes in the overall NHS budget and expenditure 
by individual programmes will be estimated which will provide a key link to the estimate of the NHS 
threshold.   Thirdly, routinely available mortality data will be more robustly translated into estimates of 
life years and QALYs gained for each programme to reflect better the impact of expenditure on 
morbidity as well as mortality.  In addition, this work will characterise the uncertainty in any estimation.  
It will also exploit recently available panel data to explore how the threshold is expected to change 
over time and examine how the threshold changes with the sign and scale of changes in expenditure.  
The structure of this research and how each element combines to provide an estimate of the NHS 
threshold (k) is illustrated in Figure 4.  Initial estimates are due to be presented in Spring 2011 and the 
final report is due in summer 2012, in time to inform VBP in 2014. 
 
Table 1 The relationship between programme expenditure and life-years gained18 
 
 
The empirical basis of the cost-effectiveness threshold will also need to be re-assessed over time, but 
with whom should this responsibility rest?  It should be apparent that the type of threshold required is 
not a social value judgement about the value of health, but a scientific question about the current 
productivity of the NHS, i.e., the relationship between changes in expenditure and outcome.  
Therefore, the threshold is not something that NICE can choose or that can be negotiated between 
Ministers, DH and manufacturers.  Nor can the value of an estimated threshold be raised (or lowered) 
to reflect the social value of different types of health improvement.  If there are other values or weights 
to be applied to health benefits then they must also be applied to the type of health likely to be 
forgone when estimating the threshold, i.e., each alternative set of value implies a different but single 
threshold for VBP (see Section 4.2).  It is important that the threshold used to generate the menu of 
Ti, Qi is known and that the methods and data for its estimation are open to scrutiny.  Indeed, the 
threshold ought to be based on the best available evidence and most appropriate methods.  This, 
however, will require scientific value judgements which might best be made independently of DH, 
NICE or manufacturers. Periodic reassessment of the threshold, based on agreed methods and data, 
will provide some predictability for manufacturers making longer term investment whilst reflecting 
changes in overall NHS expenditure and productivity. 
 
  
Cancer Circulation Respiratory Gastro-int Diabetes
04/05   Cost per LY £13,137 £7,979
05/06  Cost per LY £13,931 £8,426 £7,397 £18,999 £26,453
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Figure 4 Estimating the threshold for the UK NHS 
 
3.6.4 Transparency, accountability and redress 
 
It is critical that a VBP scheme offers transparency and the opportunity for accountability and 
ultimately redress.  However, for value-based rebates to be agreed it is also important that the value-
based transaction price T* is not revealed in a way which would impact on reference pricing in other 
countries.  If it is, then manufacturers will be unlikely to agree to value-based rebatese.  There are 
three discrete tasks which must be undertaken and each may require different levels of transparency 
and routes of accountability and redress.  These tasks include: i) an assessment of the costs and 
benefits of a new technology for each indication and identifiable subgroup within an indication; ii) 
applying an evidence based threshold to turn these estimates of costs and benefits into a menu of 
TiQi combinations; and iii) negotiating the agreed T*, Q* from this menu ensuring that the rebate (L-T* 
up to Q* and L-C for volumes greater than Q*) are recovered.   
 
The first task is already undertaken by NICE with unprecedented levels of transparency, consultation, 
rights of appeal and ultimately redress through judicial review.  Maintaining the transparency and 
accountability of this task seems crucial for all sides and there seems little to be gained by making it 
less so (it does not reveal the particular T* for reference pricing).  The third task cannot be undertaken 
by NICE (without primary legislation) but by DH.  This separation of duties might also be appropriate 
as it clearly distinguishes these tasks and reduces the potential conflict between making a balanced 
assessment of what current evidence suggests might be the costs and benefits of a product, from 
what price the NHS will actually pay. It seems that this final task need not have the same level of 
public transparency as the first as long as the process (a set of rules which mirror other markets) is 
well specified.  If they are, then accountability and redress can be achieved with a suitable appeal 
                                                          
e
 If the VBPs for the NHS are expected to be lower than transaction prices likely to be agreed in other jurisdictions which 
reference UK prices, then the UK NHS will benefit from helping to facilitate such international price discrimination by making 
any agreed T* more difficult to reference. 
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ICD.. ICD.. ICD..
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(no mortality effects)
?
Prior or scenarios
ǻB, variation in overall expenditure
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process which might use similar methods to handle commercial in confidence (CIC) information as 
existing NICE appraisal.  Ultimately access to judicial review can establish whether the rules have 
been followed without making CIC information public.  
 
The second task requires the application of an empirically based threshold to provide the menu of Ti, 
Qi.  It is critical that the threshold used is known and that the methods and data for its estimation are 
open to scrutiny.  Indeed, the threshold ought to be based on the best available evidence and most 
appropriate methods.  This, however, will require scientific value judgements which might best be 
made independently of DH, NICE or manufacturers, i.e., an independent scientific threshold 
committee whose evidence, processes and deliberation should be transparent, accountable with 
routes for redress if its decisions appear perverse or its processes are not followed.   Once estimates 
of costs and effects are established for each indication and subgroup, it is trivial to produce the menu 
of Tis based on an agreed threshold.  However, additional evidence will be required to estimate the Q i 
associated with each Ti.  NICE appears best placed to undertake this second step which would be 
conducted only after appraisal has been completed, i.e., Final Appraisal Document (FAD) issued and 
any appeal resolved.  This second step may not require the same level of public transparency and 
consultation as the first so long as there is sufficient detail provided to make scrutiny of whether it has 
been done correctly possible and an assessment of whether the Q is are reasonable estimates.  The 
different ways in which each of these three tasks might be undertaken  can be judged on the basis of 
which allow the greatest transparency and accountability while withholding the agreed T* on which 
prices might be referenced in other countries (this will depend on whether national or local volume 
agreements are included ± see Section 3.4). 
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4. Other aspects of value  
 
The principles of VBP outlined above can be implemented based on existing methods and process of 
appraisal adopted by NICE.  Such a scheme would be wholly appropriate if the measure of benefit 
captures all important aspects of social value.  However, there are four aspects of value discussed 
below which require further consideration. 
 
4.1 A premium for innovation? 
 
Although competing definitions of innovation are not particularly insightful, all make clear that it refers 
to new methods, ideas or products which are claimed to offer benefits over existing ones.19 In recent 
debates it seems more commonly invoked to support particular views of what ought to be given 
additional value or consideration when considering new patented products (pharmaceuticals and 
devices).20 It should be noted however, that there are other sources of innovation relevant to the NHS 
including new ways to deliver services as well as new surgical, diagnostic and other procedures.   
 
The question of how to value innovation and how to ensure that there are sufficient incentives for 
private investment in the development of socially desirable innovations requires a clear view of the 
social value of a health technology, its relationship to price, and the incentives this provides for private 
sector investment decisions.  These important issues are central to the principles of VBP (see 
Sections 2, 4.2 and 4.3) founded on the type of appraisal conducted by NICE in providing clear and 
predictable signals to the private sector of what is of value to the NHS. 
 
The policy question is not whether innovation should be supported.  Self evidently it should be and it 
is through patent protection, public investment in infrastructure and the research and development 
environment in the UK (including tax and other incentives).  Any VBP scheme should not undermine 
the protection offered by patents which is why rules are required which mirror markets in other sectors 
also protected by patent i.e., a free choice of the Ti, Qi  combinations so that the NHS cannot exploit 
its monopsony power and manufacturers cannot price discriminate or claim more than the current 
value of the product.  In these circumstances are there any reasons why the NHS ought to pay more 
that the current value of a product to encourage innovation?   
 
4.1.1  Anticipating future benefits of innovation 
 
It is beyond dispute that that some innovations today will provide the basis for subsequent innovations 
which may be even more valuable in the future.  The question is who should anticipate the benefits 
(and associated returns) of the possibilities of further innovation and when should the customer (the 
NHS) pay for them?  In other markets in other sectors, also protected by patent, it is the role of the 
SULYDWH VHFWRU VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V LQGXVWULDO SROLF\ WR DQWLFLSDWH WKH EHQHILWV RI IXUWKHU
innovation and the future market returns which flow from better products when making investment 
decisions.  No one suggests that consumers should be compelled to buy products (compulsion would 
indeed be required) merely to provide an additional incentive for future innovation! 
 
In any case, the NHS is not best placed to anticipate future benefits: some products may and some 
may not offer future value, and even those that do, the investment required may not be the best use 
of private capital.  Such assessment is appropriately the responsibility of the private sector because: i) 
it is best placed to anticipate the potential benefits and returns across global markets; ii) such returns 
must be compared to the cost they will commit during the development process; and iii) it is their 
decision (not the NHS') to risk private capital in such an endeavour.   Those manufacturers that are 
better at making investment decisions based on anticipating and then delivering future benefits at 
lower development costs will succeed and those that are not will rightly fail.   
 
If the NHS was to start to pay premiums for current technologies based on anticipated benefits, the 
incentives for efficient development would be perverted, damaging not enhancing future innovation.  
Even if the NHS was able to anticipate future benefits and pay an associated premium on current 
products, all value would have been given to the incumbent (manufacturers with the current patent).  
There would be no value left to offer future innovators who might be best placed to deliver the 
anticipated future benefits more quickly and at lower cost.  Furthermore, of course there would also 
be little incentive for the incumbent to put effort into making sure the anticipated benefits are actually 
realised, unless they are to be paid twice.   Since there is little evidence that these perverse 
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incentives have been properly considered in the recent policy debate about premiums for innovation, 
it is reasonable to suspect that the NHS is actually being asked to pay twice for the same benefits, 
i.e., payment for current and future value now and then payment again for the same value if and when 
it is realised.   If the NHS is not to pay twice, an innovation premium for particular products would be 
self defeating (dynamically inefficient): disincentivising the unknown innovators of the future.  If the 
NHS is to pay twice for innovation then it would be both statically and dynamically inefficient:  
reducing health outcomes across the NHS as well as blunting incentives within the sector and 
encouraging overinvestment and higher costs compared to other sectors of the economy which do not 
receive such excessive rewards.   
 
4.1.2 Incentives for innovation and location 
 
It is, however, quite proper to be concerned whether the protection offered by patents is sufficient and 
whether the UK offers an environment in which research and development activities might be located.  
Indeed, a case could quite reasonably be made that some share of NHS resources as well as other 
public money might be devoted to this if the returns from such public investment are greater in this 
sector compared to others.  In fact government already does this in a number of ways including using 
resources which could have been devoted to provision of health care. For example the investment in 
translation research following the Cooksey Report,21 as well as more fundamental science and 
biomedical research, can be viewed as an attempt to subsidise research and development and make 
the UK a more attractive location for such activities.  However, the case for an innovations premium 
within a VBP scheme to achieve the same policy goals cannot logically be made. 
 
It is not possible under EU law only to offer innovation premiums for products associated with 
manufacturers who locate in the UK.  Therefore, if a premium is to be offered it must be offered 
irrespective of location.  Although manufacturers would no doubt be grateful for this subsidy to their 
global research and development efforts, one presumes they will chose to invest it wherever offers 
the best environment.  Since other countries compete for inward investment, those that devote similar 
resources to improving their environment, rather than offering a per product premium, will have the 
advantage.  Therefore, a policy of innovation premiums will result in a perverse situation in which the 
NHS pays premiums for particular products only to find that the subsidy is invested in other countries 
which, quite sensibly, have devoted similar resources to improving the research and business 
environment instead.  This is not to suggest that the pharmaceutical sector suffers from a lack of 
gratitude, or that innovation should not be supported through other more effective means, but simply 
an observation that the discipline of international capital markets means that incentives which are not 
excludable by location will not provide any incentive for inward investment.  Innovation premiums are 
not excludable so cannot achieve the intended policy goals.  In fact they make things worse as there 
will be less resource available to improve the research and business environment if they are paid; a 
policy imperative better aligned with the responsibilities of the Department of Business, Innovation 
and Skills.   
 
4.1.3 Innovation and unmet need 
 
The principle of VBP aligns the incentives for investment in research and development with NHS 
needs.  Those manufacturers which develop products and present evidence that indicates they 
UHSUHVHQWDµVWHSFKDQJH¶LQWUHDWPHQWZLOODFKLHYHKLJKHUSULFHVDQGJUHDWHUUHWXUQs since VBPs are 
based on an assessment of the expected benefits of the technology.  Therefore, insofar as areas of 
unmet need also offer opportunities to develop technologies which offer significant improvements in 
treatment, VBP will provide a clear signal and incentive for such investment.  Equally, insofar as 
innovation is incremental, each smaller step will be rewarded, although at lower premium prices 
reflecting smaller realised benefits; preserving rewards for future innovators (see Section 4.1.1). 
 
As currently, competitors independently developing similar products but who launch after the 
originator (early followers) or those who have developed similar products based on the originators 
patent (me toos), will take some of the market share and reduce the total revenue for the originator.  
Although VBP will mean that similar products will achieve similar prices, during the originators patent, 
it will also mean that early followers or µme toos¶  will have less time to build market share and 
generate revenue before the VBPs of their and the originator's product are reduced by generic entry.  
Compared to the current situation this will tend to disincentivise development focused on existing 
patents and encourage research in less well worked areas.   
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If the incentives offered by VBP are not regarded as sufficient then the fundamental problem is on the 
supply side, i.e., patent protection is potentially too narrow and too low (which may be reasonable if 
the opportunities for step changes are now more limited, e.g., the limitations of cell receptor biology).  
However, there are trade-offs here.  Insofar as µme toos¶ are really early followers (independent 
investment in similar areas) then any shift of reward to the product which happened to be first to 
market will also make future investment in step change innovations more risky.  Therefore, policy 
considerations ought to be based on evidence that there is a problem to solve; especially once VBP 
sharpens the incentives. At present there is little evidence that returns in the sector are lower than 
others or that the there are insufficient returns for those first to market.22-24  Even if compelling 
evidence existed, it is far from evident that manipulating the demand side (paying more for the 
originators product than other similar products) would be an effective or practical policy tool.  There 
are a number of supply side policy options which may be superior in these regards.  For example, as 
well as addressing the width of patent protection (short but wide patents are more appropriate if step 
change innovation is more limited), prizes could be offered for improvements in treatment in particular 
areas as well as continued public investment in the development of basic science which will provide 
the foundation of future innovation. 
 
However, the policy concern for areas of unmet need might instead reflect a demand rather than 
supply side problem: that some aspects of social value are not fully reflected in the VBP described in 
Section 2.  For example, significant health benefits may be regarded as worth proportionately more 
than a relatively minor one (for patients and society).  Such social values might also be related to 
FRQFHSWV RI QHHG RWKHU WKDQ FDSDFLW\ WR EHQHILW VXFK DV µVHYHULW\¶ or burden (defined in terms of 
current health, or past health experience, or the length and quality of life expected to be lost as a 
consequence of the condition) and/or particular characteristics of patients.  
 
The two alternative reasons for a concern for unmet need discussed above are very different and 
need to be clearly distinguished as they require very different policy responses and will have different 
consequences.  The first may mean static losses for the NHS (if the greater value appropriated by the 
originator is at the expense of the NHS¶VVKDUHRIYDOXHEXWWKHSRWHQWLDOG\QDmic gains may be very 
dilute as UK revenue is unlikely to have measureable influence of investment decisions (the UK only 
represents 3% of the world market).  The second reason, if supported by evidence of social value and 
implemented appropriately (see Section 4.2), may offer static gains to the NHS and dynamic gains 
although equally dilute. 
 
4.2 Severity, burden and need?  
 
NICE's formal methods of technology appraisal have consistently viewed a QALY unit of health 
improvement to be equally weighted no matter what the characteristics of the recipient - sometimes 
known as 'a QALY is a QALY is a QALY'.1  When the appraisal committee considers the available 
evidence, the characteristics of patients may play a role in its decisions, but this is currently achieved 
through a deliberative process rather than formally weighting the QALYs gained.  NICE's end of life 
considerations are perhaps an exception to this process whereby the reasonableness of the QALY 
weighting necessary to make a technology cost-effective is explicitly considered by the appraisal 
committee.  However, this happens late in the appraisal process, and the cost-effectiveness analyses 
in manufacturers' submissions are required to include non-weighted QALYs.25    
 
It may be judged that other aspects of social value are not fully reflected in the measure of health gain 
used in NICE appraisal and that some additional weighting of different types of QALYs gained might 
be deemed appropriate.  For example, a larger per patient QALY gain might be regarded 
proportionately more socially valuable and carry proportionally more weight than a more modest 
QALY gain.  Alternatively, or in addition, QALY gains in areas where the burden of the disease is 
regarded as more severe (which might be defined in terms of current health, or past health 
experience, or the length and quality of life expected to be lost as a consequence of the condition) 
might be regarded as more socially YDOXDEOHDQGFDUU\JUHDWHUZHLJKW :HGRQ¶WFRPPHQWKHUHRQ
whether we believe any particular set of weights might be appropriate or how a particular set of 
weights might be arrived at.  We only note that there is an extensive literature on the estimation of 
such weights, including studies commissioned for NICE26-27 but no consensus on what weights ought 
to be used or how they should be arrived at.  The use of any set of weights will inevitably 
disadvantage some patient groups.   Therefore, without some consensus such a policy may become 
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socially divisive and unsustainable in the longer run; undermining the predictability of the signals 
offered by VBP.    
 
Setting aside the question of what weights might be appropriate, consistency demands that any 
weights that might be attached to the health likely to be gained by a technology must also be used to 
weight the health likely to be forgone elsewhere as a consequence of additional NHS costs.  This is 
crucial because if the social value of the health that is likely to be forgone is not properly accounted 
for then the VBPs will not reflect the social values embedded in any set of weights that might be 
chosen. If there are weights that are applied to the type QALYs gained then the same weights (which 
might be expressed in monetary terms) must also be applied to the QALYs likely to be forgone, i.e., 
there will be a single and common estimate of the threshold which will differ depending on which set 
of weights are adopted.  The availability of programme budget data and estimation of expenditure and 
outcome equations described in Section 3.6.3, in principle at least, allows any set of weights to be 
applied to the QALYs forgone within programmes (by ICD chapter).  For example, if QALYs gained in 
cancer are to have a greater weight than QALYs gained in respiratory health then that weight must be 
reflected in the programme specific QALY effects when estimating the threshold of the NHS (see 
Figure 4).   
 
It would be wholly inappropriate to apply additional weights to the benefits (QALY gained) but fail to 
use the same weights in calculating the opportunity costs (QALYs forgone).  The danger would be 
that the QALYs forgone might have just as much or even more social value than the QALYs gained.  
Similarly, trying to reflect social value by applying different threshold to different types of QALY gains 
in calculating VBPs would also be inappropriate as it conflates two very different questions: i) what 
social value ought to be placed on different types of QALY gained and forgone and ii) what is the 
social value of the type of QALYs are likely to be forgone as a consequence of additional costs falling 
on the NHS.  It would be impossible to find the appropriate threshold to apply to unweighted QALYs to 
reflect a consistent set of social values.  
 
4.3 Wider economic benefits? 
 
Since 2008, NICE methods of appraisal have generally restricted attention to health benefits and 
costs which fall on the NHS and Personal Social Services budget.  This NHS perspective may well be 
reasonable if the objective of collectively funded health care is to improve overall health; that the 
measure of health gained and forgone captures enough aspects of social value to be useful; and that 
the budget for health care ought to be regarded as fixed by the decision making body.  It also requires 
that either the effects outside the health care sector to be of limited socially value, compared to the 
effects within the health sector, or that wider economic benefits are closely related to improvements in 
health.   If they are then those technologies which are regarded as cost-effective from an NHS 
perspective (they improve overall health) will also offer net benefits to the wider economy, but those 
that are not will reduce overall health and impose wider net costs.  Therefore, on average, the NHS 
perspective is perhaps appropriate even if wider effects are important and deemed socially valuable.  
However, there will be exceptions, where the wider benefits associated with the health gained from a 
particular technology for a specific patient group is expected to be substantially greater or less than 
other displaced NHS activities.  The questions of fact and value on which the question of appropriate 
perspective turns and alternative policy responses have been evaluated in recent DH funded report.28 
 
Wider effects fall into two broad types:  i) direct costs of care that do not fall on the health care 
budget; and ii) the indirect external effects on the rest of the economy.  Some of the direct costs of 
care are borne by patients (e.g., out of pocket costs, time in accessing care) and may include the 
direct financial consequences of ill health (and financial benefits of earlier recovery) for patients and 
families if these are not fully captured in measures of health related quality of life. It will also include 
the time and resources devoted to caring for patients outside the health care system. Such direct 
costs may fall on marketed and non marketed activities (e.g., time and informal care).  Importantly, an 
effective health technology may reduce these costs (e.g., a quicker recovery) or increase them (e.g., 
prolong survival in a chronic state).  There are also indirect effects external to the patients, their family 
or informal carers but which are valued by the rest of society. For example, returning a patient to 
active participation in the labour market may add to production in the economy.  This will be a net 
bHQHILWWRWKHUHVWRIVRFLHW\LIWKHYDOXHRIWKHDGGLWLRQDOSURGXFWLRQH[FHHGVWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDGGLWLRQDO
consumption over their remaining life expectancy.  Therefore, an effective health technology may 
provide external benefits by reducing mortality in economically active groups whose production is 
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likely to exceed their consumption.  However, it may also impose external costs on the economy if it 
reduces mortality in populations where remaining life cycle consumption exceeds the value of 
production.   
 
Although the implications of taking account of some external effects might be regarded as 
undesirable, once wider consumption effects are taken into account  it becomes difficult to justify why 
only some effects should be included and others not.  If conflicts arise this is because there are other 
aspects of social value which are difficult to specify and codify. It should also be clear that properly 
taking account of external effects must work both ways: that although some technologies might 
achieve higher VBPs as a consequence, the VBPs of others will be lower than they would have been 
with a narrower NHS perspective.  
 
4.3.1 Appropriately valuing opportunity costs 
 
All these direct and indirect external effects fall on consumption (gained or lost) outside the health 
sector rather than on health (gained or forgone) within it, i.e., the type of opportunity costs differ. This 
ought to be reflected in the weight attached to the different types of effects. For example, external 
benefits (e.g., a reduction in patent and career costs) cannot be used by the NHS to provide 
additional health care and generate health.  Equally additional costs which do not fall on the NHS 
budget will displace consumption rather than health. Therefore, external costs and benefits cannot be 
treated in the same way as NHS costs, which displace health at a rate given by the cost-effectiveness 
threshold (see Section 3.6.3).  A means of valuing health generated by the NHS relative to wider 
consumption effects is required, i.e., an agreed consumption value of health. Since those who bear 
the external costs or enjoy the benefits are generally free to chose how to consume, an appropriate 
value might be the amount of consumption individuals are willing to give up to improve their own 
health.  There are a number of reasons why such a consumption value of health is likely to be higher 
than the cost-effectiveness threshold for the NHS.28 Therefore, when taking proper account of 
external costs or benefits only some weight, between zero and one (based on the ratio of the cost-
effectiveness threshold to the consumption value of health), ought to be applied to them. This 
effectively places policy between the two extremes of either disregarding external effects or ignoring 
the implications of a budget constrained NHS.   
 
4.3.2 Wider economic benefits forgone 
 
The additional health care costs of new technologies will displace other health care activities, not only 
resulting in forgone health elsewhere, but also forgone EHQHILWV WR SDWLHQWV¶ FDUHUV DQG WKH ZLGHU
economy.  Therefore, it is not sufficient to observe wider economic benefits associated with a new 
technology, but there is a need also to establish that these exceed the benefits which may be forgone 
elsewhere as other NHS activities are displaced. A failure to take proper account of the wider 
economic benefits likely to be forgone would result in doubly false positive decisions, i.e., 
technologies priced such that the health benefits offered are less than the health forgone and, in 
addition, the wider economic benefits are also exceeded by those that are forgone elsewhere.   
Including as assessment of external effects in a VBP scheme provides a strong incentive for 
manufacturers to search assiduously for evidence of wider benefits associated with new technologies, 
but offers little incentive to identify those external benefits which may be forgone.  Therefore a proper 
and rigorous assessment of external benefits forgone is essential.  
 
Identifying precisely which activities are displaced at a local level in the NHS and estimating their 
associated cost-effectiveness from an NHS perspective is notoriously difficult.29  It would be an even 
greater challenge to also try to estimate the associated wider costs and benefits.  However, at a more 
aggregate level, evidence suggests that improvements in health generally offer net consumption 
benefits to the wider economy.30-32 Therefore, on average across the NHS, both health will be forgone 
due to additional NHS costs and this forgone health will also be associated with displaced 
consumption benefits.  The amount of health likely to be forgone is provided through the estimate of 
the costs-effectiveness threshold (see Section 3.6.3) but further work would be required to estimate 
the wider benefits associated with it.  It might also be possible to reflect the impact of the type of 
health likely to be forgone since estimates of the threshold can now be based on evidence of where 
displacement is likely to occur (which programme budget category and associated ICD chapter ± see 
Figure 4).  The programmes and ICD chapters are also associated with different types of patient 
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characteristics (e.g., age at diagnosis) which could, in principle, also be used to improve the estimates 
of the wider economic benefits that are likely to be forgone.   
 
Nevertheless, it should be recognised that extending the perspective for VBP will impose additional 
costs on the appraisal process and introduce the possibility of a biased assessment if the economic 
benefits forgone elsewhere are more difficult to identify. The problem may be more manageable if the 
consideration was restricted to those exceptional cases where an NHS perspective is more likely to 
be inadequate, i.e., where the external economic benefits are likely to be substantially greater or less 
than current NHS activities which may be displaced. 
 
Even if properly conducted, VBP which includes an assessment of wider economic benefits will have 
static and dynamic effects that may or may not be socially desirable. Technologies will be VB priced 
to the point at which the overall benefits, to the NHS and the wider economy, will be zero.  Insofar as 
new technologies tend to offer net benefits to the wider economy these will be appropriated by 
manufacturers through higher prices, at least during the period of patent protection, turning what were 
originally external benefits into higher internal NHS costs, so overall health will be reduced.  
Therefore, there is a danger that immediate static losses for the NHS might never be compensated for 
by later dynamic gains if the limited incentives by the UK market do not sufficiently influence future 
global investment decisions about the type of technologies that are developed.   
 
4.3.3 Questions of fact and value 
 
Extending the perspective for appraisal beyond the NHS poses a series of empirical questions which 
would need to be resolved.  As well as an empirically based estimate of the cost-effectiveness 
threshold (which should also reflect non-marginal impacts on the NHS budget), an agreed estimate of 
the consumption value of health is also needed. Critically, an estimate of the wider benefits likely to 
be forgone is required.  Finally, robust estimates of the cost of care not borne by the NHS, and the 
external effects on the wider economy would be needed. There are a number of questions of social 
value posed in resolving how these elements should be measured and valued.  Taking account of 
effects outside the health care sector requires a social value judgement about the rate at which 
society is willing to trade social arguments including health and consumption.  A key question is 
whether it is possible or desirable to specify such a description of all possible social states which will 
have implications for decision across all sectors, not just health.  If a complete specification of all 
social arguments is not possible or if any particular welfare function does not carry a broad consensus 
or obvious legitimacy, then attempts to formalise and codify these trade-offs might be undesirable 
because the prescriptions may well conflict with other objectives of social policy and lead to 
undesirable and socially divisive changes to the health care system. 
 
4.4 Uncertainty, evidence and investment  
 
An assessment of expected cost-effectiveness, or net health benefits, relies on evidence about 
effectiveness, impact on long-term overall health and potential harms, as well as the costs which fall 
on the NHS budget with some assessment of what health is likely to be forgone as a consequence.  
Such assessments are inevitably uncertain, especially at launch when the evidence base is least 
mature.33  Without sufficient and good quality evidence, subsequent decisions about the use of 
technologies and the appropriate VBP will also be uncertain, i.e., there will be a chance that the 
resources committed by agreeing a VBP for a new technology may be wasted if the expected net 
health benefits are not realised.  Equally, VBPs which restrict the use of a new technology only to the 
most cost-effective subgroups, will risk failing to provide access to a valuable intervention if the net 
health benefits prove to be greater than expected.  Therefore, if the social objective is to improve 
overall health for both current and future patients, then the need for and value of additional evidence 
is an important consideration when making decisions about the use of technologies and the prices 
that ought to be paid.   
 
4.4.1 Value of access and the value of evidence 
 
The value of access to a new technology with uncertain benefits and the value of additional evidence 
about the technology is illustrated in Table 2.34    
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Table 2 The value of early access and the value of evidence.  Two treatments are compared: A (current 
treatment) and B (new treatment). 
  
 
In this example, on average, the net health benefit of the new technology (NHB(B)=11) is expected to 
be greater than current treatment (NHB(A)=10), so at current prices early access to the new 
technology is expected to offer 1 additional QALY per patient.  However, this assessment is uncertain 
(represented by the 3 possible resolutions of NHB) and there is a chance that the new treatment may 
not be cost-effective, i.e., a probability of 1/3.  If more evidence could be acquired to resolve this 
uncertainty then better decisions could be made, improving net health benefit (Max NHB=12, as 
shown in the final column).  The upper bound on the value of additional evidence is the difference 
between the best that can be done if the uncertainty could be resolved and the best that can be done 
if decisions are based on existing information, i.e., also 1 QALY per patient.  Therefore, evidence 
about the performance of a new and effective technology is valuable for the same reasons as access 
to it, both improve health outcomes, and the value of evidence may be as great, or greater, than the 
value of the technology itself.     
 
If the type of research which is required can be conducted once the technology is available for use in 
the NHS, the VBP at launch can be based on estimates of expected cost and effects (as described in 
earlier sections).  However, even in these favourable circumstances, there is an important link 
between VBP, uncertainty and the need for evidence. As discussed in Section 3.6.2, reappraisal of 
VBP, among other things, ought to be triggered by significant new evidence becoming available; 
increasing the VBP if the evidence suggests that benefits were originally underestimated, or reducing 
it if they where overestimated.  This means that manufacturers retain an incentive to conduct further 
evaluative research if they believe that there are additional benefits which could not be evidenced at 
launch.  Publically funded evaluative research, however, will still be required where these incentives 
are insufficient and especially in those cases where the original evidence is likely to have 
overestimated the benefits.  However, it should be noted that linking VBPs to the results of publically 
funded research means that the NHS will only benefit if the results lead to lower VBPs (thus avoiding 
the losses of net health benefit at the original VBP).  Manufacturers will, however, be able to 
appropriate the value of evidence when it suggests that net health benefits were originally 
underestimated and this leads to higher prices.  This might inform whether manufacturers should be 
expected to generate evidence through approval with research (AWR) agreements or make some 
contribution to the costs of publically funded research.  Some of these considerations are reflected in 
the flexible pricing arrangements of the current PPRS.13   
 
4.4.2 Price and the value of evidence 
 
These considerations are even more critical once it is recognised that the approval of a technology for 
widespread use might reduce the prospects of conducting the type of research that would provide the 
evidence needed. For example, the early diffusion of a technology means that future clinical trials are 
less likely to be supported or regarded as ethical by the clinical community, even when public funds 
are made available for such research; and patients are unlikely to enrol in clinical trials once they 
have unrestricted access to the new technologies.   In these circumstances there will be a trade-off 
between the expected net benefits for current patients from early access to a cost-effective 
technology and the health benefits for future patients from withholding approval until valuable 
research has been conducted, i.e., an only in research (OIR) recommendation.35-36   
NHB (A) NHB (B) Max NHB
1 4 1 4
2 10 10 10
3 16 22 22
Average 10 11 12
Value of access
Value of evidence
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For a VBP which fails to account for the value of evidence, the expected benefits of the technology 
just offset the health likely to be forgone, so the expected net benefits of early access across current 
NHS patients will be zero.  Therefore, insofar as there is value associated with the type of evidence 
that cannot be acquired once the technology is in widespread use, the NHS would be better off 
(improve net benefits across current and future patients) by restricting access to the technology until 
the research can be conducted.  It is important to retain this option of restricting access because it 
provides an incentive for manufacturers to provide the type of evidence needed to support NHS use 
at launch or to negotiate lower prices which reflect the value of evidence forgone by early access.  For 
example, if there is uncertainty about the scale of the benefits offered by a technology then, an 
appropriate VBP would provide sufficient positive net benefits of early access for current NHS patients 
to just offset the value of evidence (net benefits) for future patients which would be forgone, i.e., the 
VBP will be lower than the price which would make the technology just expected to be cost-effective 
(with zero net benefits). This lower VBP, which accounts for the need for evidence, provides an 
important incentive for manufacturers: higher prices can be achieved by developing effective 
technologies and by generating the type of evidence needed to support clinical practice.  In this way a 
VBP scheme that incorporates a consideration of uncertainty can provide signals and incentives for 
the type of evidence needed by the NHS. 
 
A failure to take account of the need for further evidence at launch will tend to undermine the 
evidence base for future clinical practice.  If an assessment of uncertainty and the need for evidence 
is incorporated into a VBP scheme then, in some circumstances, forgoing the evidence may be 
appropriate but only at prices lower than the VBPs described in Section 2.  However, there will be 
circumstances in which any reduction in VBPs will not eliminate the need for further research (e.g., 
when uncertainty primarily surrounds whether the technology is effective rather than its magnitude), 
so the possibility of withholding approval or restricting access until research is conducted, i.e., an OIR 
recommendation, must be retained.   
 
4.4.3 Investment, uncertainty and price 
 
Investment costs are those which, once committed, cannot be recovered if a decision is revised at a 
later date.  These are generally considered to be costs with a long life expectancy such as those 
incurred in providing new facilities or equipment necessary to use the new technology.37-38  These are 
commonly annuitised in appraisal and included in the expected costs of the technology, but the 
impact of their irrecoverable nature is often not explored.   Irrecoverable costs also include situations 
where initially negative net heath benefits of a new technology are offset by later positive net benefits.  
This is illustrated in Figure 5 where the initial losses (area A) are more than offset by the later gains 
(area B) - the technology is expected to be cost-effective overall.  However, if approval is revised 
(e.g., due to research revealing that the technology is not as effective as expected) then initial losses 
will have been incurred which will not be compensated by later gains.  Overall losses will tend to be 
greater if decisions are more likely to change and in the more immediate future. 
 
There are many common circumstances where initial losses are only offset by later gains.  For 
example, when practitioners must learn how to best use a new technology by experience, then the 
initial learning costs imposed on patients (who will not get the maximum benefit from the new 
technology) are compensated by later gains once the technology can be used to its full potential.  
Similarly, when it is not possible for practitioners to identify those patients likely to respond to 
treatment without first treating them, the initial population net health benefit will be lower as non-
responders impose a cost without any additional benefit.  As non-responders are identified and 
treatment is withdrawn, overall treatment costs fall and net benefit increases.  In many circumstances 
the initial per patient costs of a technology can be very high and far in excess of the immediate health 
benefits in the initial period of treatment.  However, these losses tend to be offset by future health 
benefits and sometimes reductions in future NHS costs.  Therefore, Figure 5 represents a common 
pattern for technologies with mortality affects. 
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Figure 5 Uncertainty, investment and price 
 
The irrecoverable nature of these costs can have particular influence on whether or not purchasing a 
technology represents a worthwhile investment.35 37  Even if further research is not required, as long 
as there are other sources of uncertainty which may resolve over time, an assessment of the benefits 
and costs of early approval is needed. This should take account of investment costs and the risk that 
the expected longer term benefits will not be realised and more immediate losses incurred. Therefore, 
even though a technology might be expected to be cost-effective, it may not represent a valuable 
investment because the decision to purchase the technology will commit immediate costs that the 
NHS cannot recover once the other sources of uncertainty have resolved.  A VBP which reflects the 
irrecoverable costs and the risks of incurring losses would make the investment just worthwhile for the 
NHS.  This will be lower than the price at which the technology is expected to be cost-effective (the 
price at which area A=B in Figure 5).   
 
The impact of irrecoverable costs is compounded when further research is also required because it 
adds to the risk that a decision to purchase the technology will be revised.  In these circumstances, 
even when research could be conducted while the technology is in widespread use, restricting access 
through an OIR recommendation may be better for the NHS if the expected benefits of early access 
do not offset the expected losses.39-40  Again, a lower VBP would be required before the NHS should 
take the risk of committing irrecoverable costs in purchasing the technology while also awaiting the 
results of research.  Where the research needed cannot be conducted, once a technology is 
approved for NHS use, the opportunity costs of early approval now include the impact of investment 
and reversal costs when decisions might be revised as well as the value of evidence that will be 
forgone by early access.  A VBP which would allow immediate access ought to reflect both these 
aspects of opportunity costs and will be lower than the VBPs discussed in Sections 2 and 4.4.2.   
 
Although aspects of investment or reversal cost are almost always present, their potential significance 
depends on their scale relative to expected population net benefits offered by the technology.  Since 
the latter may be zero under VBP, the proper assessment of investment costs becomes especially 
important.  Critically, their impact depends on the risk that decisions (approval and pricing) will be 
revised in the near or distant future due to new evidence becoming available, the launch of new 
technologies or changes in the prices of existing technologies.  Irrecoverable costs are a common 
feature of very many pharmaceuticals which are likely to be included in the VBP scheme post 2014.  
Failure to take account of the impact the irrecoverable nature of the costs in establishing VBPs would 
place the NHS at risk of purchasing technologies where the expected long term benefits which are 
expected to offset the immediate losses are not realised.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
The introduction of VBP after 2014 provides an opportunity to found pharmaceutical pricing and 
access to new health technologies on sound principles; reflective of social values and the reality of a 
budget constrained NHS.  This requires: clarity on key issues of principle and social value; as well as 
critical details of how it will be implemented and operate. 
 
The type of robust, scientific and accountable assessment of the costs and benefits offered by a 
technology already embodied in the NICE appraisal process is, of course, essential.  However, it is 
equally important that the assessment of the health expected to be forgone elsewhere in the NHS due 
to additional costs displacing other NHS activities, i.e., the cost-effectiveness threshold, is equally 
robust, scientific and accountable.  In addition transparent rules of how prices might be negotiated 
based on such assessment are required.  Rules, which are reflective of markets in other sectors 
where investment is also protected by patent, provide a model which would give confidence that the 
NHS would not undermine patent protection by exploiting its monopsony power.  It would also protect 
the NHS from manufacturers offering all or nothing deals or engaging in price discrimination.  The 
triggers for when VBPs, once set, would be reconsidered also need to be clearly established.  These 
triggers must include patent expiry and the entry of cheaper generics and significant new evidence 
becoming available. Without the former, the NHS may never benefit from innovation even in the 
longer run and, without the latter, incentives for manufacturers conducting evaluative research will be 
undermined and/or the NHS will not realise the benefits of publically funded research.   
 
The details of how the VBP scheme will be implemented and operate are also important.  For 
example, an effective vehicle for price negotiation might be value-based rebates through a PPRS-type 
arrangement rather than reductions in UK list prices.  Since the UK represents only 3% of the world 
market the influence of VBP in the UK on global investment appears limited.  However, there is an 
opportunity to use the scheme to align incentives for local prescribing, which, in the absence of 
mandatory NICE guidance on the use of health technologies after 2014, is especially important.  
Since VBP is necessarily linked to particular indications and subgroups, there is an inevitable link 
between price and volume. Therefore, any agreed rebate needs to be combined with volume 
agreements which might be specified at a national or local level. 
 
The introduction of VBP also poses the question of whether there are other aspects of social value 
which ought to be included.  The notion that premiums ought to be paid for innovation itself has little 
to commend it as there are other much more effective ways to provide incentives for future 
innovations of value to the NHS and for inward investment in research and development in the UK.  It 
is no doubt possible that different types of health benefits might be valued differently by society.  This 
is already recognised in the NICE appraisal process where the reference case of equal QALY 
weighting is taken as a useful starting point for deliberation.  VBP would require any values or 
weighting to be made much more explicit.  The difficulty is that the social values or weights that ought 
to apply and how they should be established is far from self evident.   What is critical, however, is that 
any values or weights which are assigned to the health benefits associated with new technologies 
must also be applied equally to the health likely to be forgone as services are displaced to fund the 
new ones.  In other words a clear distinction is required between the social values that might be 
applied and any empirical estimate of the social value of the health likely to be forgone, i.e., a single 
common threshold is required which is reflective of any weights applied to the type of health benefits 
offered.   
 
Other effects outside the NHS, such as reduction in the cost of care born by patients and their carers 
or external benefits to the wider economy, might also be included in assessment of value.  All these 
direct and indirect external effects fall on consumption (gained or lost) outside the health sector rather 
than on health (gained or forgone) within it, i.e., the type of opportunity costs differ. This ought to be 
reflected in the weight attached to the different types of effects. For example, external benefits (e.g., a 
reduction in patent and career costs) cannot be used by the NHS to provide additional health care 
and generate health.  As well as requiring a number of social and scientific value judgements, it will 
also require some assessment of the external benefits which are likely to be forgone as other NHS 
care is displaced.  In other words, and consistent with the position for social values or weights 
discussed above,  it is not enough to establish that a new technology offers benefits to patients, 
carers and the wider economy, but that these benefits exceed those likely to be forgone as a 
consequence of the additional costs of the technology.   
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Finally, there needs to be a recognition that appropriate VBPs depend in part on uncertainty, the 
value of additional evidence, whether it can be acquired once the technology is in widespread NHS 
use and the scale of irrecoverable costs committed by the NHS when purchasing the technology.  The 
link between VBP and evidence provides an incentive for manufacturers to conduct evaluative 
research relevant to the NHS prior to or after launch.  There will be circumstances, however, when the 
type of research required cannot be conducted once VBP is agreed.  Since manufacturers may be 
unable or unwilling to reduce the price sufficiently to compensate the NHS for the value of evidence 
that might be forgone, the NHS must retain the right to withhold access until further research is 
conducted by the manufacturers or through publically funded research. 
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